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CUDJOE v. COMMONWEALTH
23 VA.APP 193,475 S.E.2d 821
Court of Appeals of Virginia
I. FACTS
The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Hambrey
Millton Cudjoe with rape and aggravated sexual battery
and brought him before the Circuit Court, City of
Richmond. During the jury selection process, opposing
counsel questioned the twenty-person jury panel. Both
counsel exercised their statutory right to peremptory
strikes pursuant Virginia Code 19.2-262.2 The trial judge
then inquired whether counsel had any motions, at
which point the defense attorney objected to the
Commonwealth's striking of three minority jurors. The
Commonwealth offered its reasons for the peremptory
strikes. The trial court upheld two of the three strikes.
Defense counsel's objections are not at issue in this case.
The Commonwealth's Attorney then objected 5 to the
6
defendant's striking of four Caucasian jurors. The court
upheld two of the strikes and disallowed the third, that
of Walter Craigie. This necessitated an additional strike
7
by the defense.
As grounds for striking Craigie, defense counsel stat-
ed, "I don't think he could relate with a person of Mr.
Cudjoe's standing."8 The Commonwealth offered no argu-
ment in support of its opposition to the strike, and did
not allege that the asserted reason for the peremptory
strike was pretextual. 9 Moreover, the trial judge did not
undertake any findings of fact and did not explicitly rule
that the strike was racially motivated, which is a clear
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet, the trial
court disallowed the strike, thereby seating Mr. Craigie
on the jury and forcing defense counsel to strike anoth-
er juror. I The record is void of any indication as to the
12
racial makeup of the jury as finally sworn. At trial, the
ICudjoe v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 193,475 S.E.2d 821
(1980).
Code § 19.2-262 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Twelve persons from a panel of twenty shall con-
stitute a jury in a felony case...
(3) The parties or their counsel, beginning with the
attorney for the Commonwealth, shall alternatively strike off
one name from the panel until the number remaining shall be




6Defense counsel corrected the Commonwealth, stating
that he struck only three Caucasian jurors.
7Cudjoe at 200.
jury convicted the defendant, Hambrey Milton Cudjoe, of
rape and aggravated sexual battery.
II. HOLDING
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's decision. The appellate court found that the
Commonwealth failed to show the defendant's explana-
tion for the strike was pretextual." In addition, the
Commonwealth offered no basis at trial for its current
contention that the defendant's explanation for the
Craigie strike was unbelievable. "The appellate court fur-
ther held that absent a violation of the Equal Protection
clause, the trial court denied appellant his statutory right
to a peremptory strike. 6 The court reasoned that no
curative instruction could have been given to correct the17
trial court's error. The trial court's error is presumed
prejudicial, "unless it plainly appears that it could not18
have affected the result." The appellate court found no
evidence that the jury's verdict was unsupported by the
weight of the evidence or that the record demonstrated
any lack of soundness in the verdict. '9 Despite the appar-
ent validity of the verdict the error was "substantial and• . 20
significant" precluding the court from finding that the
appellant received a fair trial on the merits.
Ill. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
A. CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
While the defense did not raise a contemporaneous
objection, the court precluded this as a possible argu-



















Craigie sufficiently complied with Rule 5A: 18. The
Court of Appeals held that when the trial court made its
ruling, the trial court, "... had the positions of both par-
ties clearly before it and fully understood the issues
involved." No subsequent objection by the appellant
was necessary to preserve the right to challenge the
court's ruling on appeal.
B. BATSON CHALLENGES
On appeal, the court began its review of the trial
court's decision by examining Batson" challenges. In
Swain, the Supreme Court, stated that a peremptory chal-
lenge is one that is "exercised without a reason stated,
without inquiry, and without being subject to the court's
control " 25 and one that compared to strikes for cause
"permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is
less easily designated or demonstrable:' Batson quali-
fled this rule by guaranteeing a defendant the right to a
trial by a jury that has been "selected pursuant to nondis-
criminatory criteria"27 and by prohibiting the use of
peremptory strikes "to challenge potential jurors solely
on account of their race." Batson extends the protec-
tions of the Equal Protection clause to defendants during
jury selection. 9 This protection now applies to0Peremp -
tory strikes in both criminal and civil cases and to
strikes by the defendant.
The court applied the same race prejudice test
applied to the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes to
determine whether the defendant's peremptory strike of
Craigie was allowable." Under this test, laid out in James33
v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth bears the bur-
den of making a prima facie showing that the strike was
22Virginia Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Rule
5A:18 provides: No ruling of the trial court or the Virginia
Worker's Compensation Commission will be considered as a
basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with
the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good
cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the
ends of justice.A mere statement that the judgment or award is
contrary to the law and the evidence is not sufficient to con-
stitute a question to be ruled upon on appeal.
"Id at 197.
24Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).
Batson established the rule that peremptory strikes must be
used in such a way as not to deny potential jurors a seat solely
on the basis of their race, thereby violating the Equal
Protection Clause.







29united States Constitution,Article IV, Section 2, Clause 13
0Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 11
based on race.34 The defendant then bears the burden of
showing a race-neutral explanation for striking the35
juror. If the court determines the explanation to be
race-neutral, the Commonwealth may show why the
explanation, although facially race-neutral, is in fact pre-36
textual. Finally, the court must determine whether the
Commonwealth satisfied its burden of showing inten-
tional discrimination.37
As applied to the facts of this case, the test requires
the court to evaluate the appellant's proffered reason for
the Craigie strike. Appellant stated, "I think he may have
difficulty relating to this case based on his name. He was
reading the Wall Street Journal, and has a lot of activities
on Main Street. I don't think he could relate with a per-
son of Mr. Cudjoe's standing:' 3 After presenting this race-
neutral reason, the burden shifted to the Commonwealth
to show the reason offered was pretextual. The trial
court did not apply the James test. It heard no argument
from the Commonwealth, whose attorney never disput-
ed the nondiscriminatory nature of the strike and who
did not argue that the peremptory strike was pretextual.
The Commonwealth merely stated that Craigie is white
and the appellant is black, failing to address the appel-
lant's contention that the strike was based on back-
39
ground and economic status.
On review, the Court of Appeals limited its review to
the Commonwealth's contention that the reason for the
Craigie strike was pretextual. 40 The proper test for
41review, as adapted from Barksdale v. Commonwealth ,
states that "a court must determine whether, assuming
the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenge are
true, the challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause42
as a matter of law." If the court concludes there was no
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the question
S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991).3 1Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120
L.Ed.2d 33 (1992).32Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449,450-51,443 S.E.2d
414,415 (1994). See also James v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 459,
461-62,442 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1994).






'9Id at 201.The Commonwealth based its appeal its belief
that the trial judge "simply did not believe defense counsel
when he states that fie struck Craigie because of his financial
and economic background, rather than because he was a dif-
ferent race than the defendant."
40
Id at 200.
41See Barksdale v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 456, 459-
60,438 S.E.2d 761,763 (1993).
42
Cud/oe at 201.
then becomes "whether counsel's race-neutral explana-
tion for a peremptory challenge should be believed."43
The appellate court found that the uncontradicted evi-
dence showed the appellant struck Craigie for non-dis-
crininatory reasons, and that the Commonwealth never
showed the appellant's strike to be pretextual. The court
ruled that the evidence did not support the trial court's
decision to disallow the peremptory strike of Craigie."
C. HARMLESS ERROR
The Commonwealth argued that even if the trial
court erred in disallowing the Craigie strike, such error
was harmless, as the right to a peremptory strike is statu-
45easl
tory and not constitutional . The court of appeals, citing
46
Ross v. Oklahoma, agreed that the error was statutory
and not constitutional, but held that it must apply
47
Virginia's harmless error statute, in keeping withS 48
Lavinder The Lavinder test requires a criminal convic-
tion to be overturned unless it ylainly appears that the
error did not affect the verdict. Furthermore, "an error
does not affect a verdict if a reviewing court can con-
clude . . . that, had the error not occurred, the verdict
would have been the same."50
An error is presumed to be prejudicial "unless it
plainly appears that it could not have affected the
result."5 Here, the court found that no curative instruc-
tion could have corrected the trial court's error. More
importantly, the court held that "Craigie's presence on
the jury in conflict with the appellant's expressed desire
to remove him is indicative of prejudice."52 Based on
these factors, the court was unable to conclude that the
defendant received a fair trial on the merits.5 Therefore,
the court reversed the appellant's conviction and






4Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101
L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).
47Va Code 1950, 9 8.01-678 states that: When it plainly
appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that
the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial jus-
tice has been reached, no judgment shall be arrested or
reversed:
1. For the appearance of either party, being under the
age of eighteen years, by attorney, if the verdict, where there is
one, or the judgment be for him and not to his prejudice; or
2. For any other defect, imperfection, or omission in
the record, or for any error committed on the trial.
'sLavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 1003, 1005,407
IV CONCURRENCE/DISSENT
Judge Annunziata concurred in part and dissented in
part. Judge Annunziata concurred with the majority in
finding that the trial court erred in disallowing the
Cragie strike, but deemed the error harmless. The judge
reasoned the error was harmless, as "... it has been well
said that there is no such thing as a perfect trial. Every
man is entitled to a fair trial and to nothing more..."
The dissent conceded that the defendant was denied the
statutory right to strike, but concluded that the jury was
nevertheless impartial and that Craigie was "indifferent
to the cause."7 Judge Annunziata reasoned that, given the
combination of the evidence supporting the appellant's
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and the impartial-
ity of the jury, the "conclusion is compelled that the
record plainly shows that the erroneous denial of appel-
lant's strike did not deprive appellant of a fair trail or
substantial justice and, therefore, did not affect the ver-
dict."58 Based on this analysis Judge Annunziata would
affirm the conviction.
V CONCLUSION
Under Swain, a peremptory strike is one that may
be exercised with little or no restrictions by the court.
Unlike a challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge
permits a potential juror to be rejected for "a real or.... 59
imagined partiality." The only restrictions placed on the
use of peremptory strikes are those imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause and cases such as Batson and its
progeny. By invalidating the juror strike in question the
trial court added conditions for a strike that are not
found in either the .Constitution or any statute.
Furthermore, the court never stated what those condi-
S.E.2d 910,911 (1991) (en banc).
Id.
50Id at 1005.
5 1Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 291,296,269 S.E.2d
811,814 (1980).
"Cudjoe at 205.
-1d at 206.54Id at 206.
"Id at 206.
5 Cudjoe quoting Oliver v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 533,
541 145 S.E. 307,309 (1928).
57 Cudjoe quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297,
298 227 S.E.2d 734,735 (1976).
58
5Cudjoe at 207.
"Swain v.Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d
759 (1965).
tions were or why the striking party did not comply.
The trial court inferred racial animus toward the
defense's strike of a white juror. Despite the fact that
there were no allegations or findings of any racial preju-
dice, and that the commonwealth, at trial, did not dispute
the basis of the strike in question, the court disallowed
the defense's attempt to strike a white juror. The court
disregarded the defense's race neutral explanation and
made no findings of fact as to the basis for the strike.
In assuming a race-based motivation for the strike,
the court made a decision with strong precedential con-
sequences. Had the trial court's decision not been over-
turned on appeal, it created the possibility for a court to
inject itself into an area from which it had been previ-
ously excluded. Particularly, this expansion of the role of
the judiciary would have granted courts the power to
determine the outcome of a case, by playing an active
role in jury selection. Such a judicial role is not envi-
sioned in the due process clause or in the Batson line of
cases. Cudjoe marks the appellate court's repudiation of
such overreaching by the trial courts.
Cudjoe further elaborates on the Batson line of
cases by holding that even where the trial court's error
cannot be shown to have affected the verdict, and where
the error is statutory and not constitutional, justice has
not been served and a new trial is required. Cudjoe also
stands for the proposition that courts may not infer mal-
ice where one party seeks to uphold a strike that is chal-
lenged on the basis or race. Such a determination may
only be the result of the application of the James test.
Here, the defense sought to strike a juror for race neutral
reasons. After the prosecution objected, the court disal-
lowed the strike despite the defense's explanation. The
appellate court implied, in reversing the lower court
decision, that peremptory strikes will be upheld absent a
clear showing that the strike was racially motivated.
The Cudoe decision highlights the importance of
the peremptory strike, as well as the trial court's power
to affect the trial outcome by its rulings on peremptory
strikes. This decision also reiterates the constitutional
protections of the Batson challenge and the more recent
adaptation of this rule to defense strikes. Further, in
applying Virginia's harmless error statute, the court
found that where a juror was erroneously allowed to sit
on a jury, the defendant is denied a fair trial. This pre-
sumption of harm is extremely important, as it provides
a criminal defendant with what amounts to automatic
grounds for appeal whenever the trial court rules incor-
rectly on a peremptory strike, even where this error can-
not be shown to have affected the verdict.
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